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Very atypical agreement indeed
Michael cysouw
1.	 What	is	agreement,	anyway?
In their thorough reappraisal of the lengthy scholarly debate about pointing and 
directional verbs in sign languages, Lilo-Martin & Meier (LM&M, this vol-
ume) argue that (i) both pointing and directionality in sign language are com-
parable to person marking in spoken languages, and (ii) directionality in sign 
language is comparable to agreement in spoken languages. The first p roposition 
(i) is well-argued for, but the second (ii) is not. The authors seem to assume that 
by arguing for (i) they implicitly have argued for (ii), but this indicates a mis-
conception of the meaning of the term agreement.
Without taking any issue with Lilo-Martin & Meier’s arguments themselves 
(which in the case of person marking seem perfectly legitimate to me), their 
arguments do not substantiate the claim that directionality is similar to agree-
ment in spoken language. At most, directionality seems to be an extremely 
non-canonical form of agreement, which, as the authors write themselves “may 
[ . . . ] be an indication that an analysis using another approach would be more 
successful” (LM&M §6.0). The problem seems to be that the authors equate 
the term ‘agreement’ with ‘inflectional person marking’. Unfortunately, this 
interpretation is widespread in current linguistic theory, but it has little theo-
retical or practical validity.
In current linguistic practice two rather different notions of agreement are 
attested. The first notion, which I will designate as agreement/concord, defines 
agreement as some kind of systematic covariance of linguistic expressions, 
like in Italian singular il nuovo cuadro (‘the new picture’) vs. plural i nuovi 
cuadri (‘the new pictures’, Corbett 2006: 9). The second usage, which I will 
call agreement/inflection, reduces the notion of agreement to subject-verb 
c ovariance only. And even more extremely, in this tradition often agreement 
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simply designates any verb inflection with reference to the subject (e.g. as in 
the various articles in Boeckx 2006). Although Lilo-Martin & Meier explicitly 
refer to Corbett (2006) as their source for the notion agreement, in practice 
they never use his definitions and criteria to evaluate the sign language phe-
nomena. They simply interpret the similarity between directionality in sign 
language and person inflection in spoken language as sufficient evidence to 
call them both agreement. This only makes sense when agreement is inter-
preted as agreement/inflection, and not as Corbett’s agreement/concord.
In this commentary, I will first present a concise history of the term agree-
ment to clarify the origin of the contemporary terminological confusion. 
F ollowing that, I will sketch the kind of argumentation needed to show that 
directionality is agreement/concord, only to conclude that this does not seem 
to be the most promising approach. Directionality can still be conceived as an 
slightly special example of agreement/inflection, but that only implies that 
d irectionality is a kind of inflectional person marking. If that is the desired 
conclusion, then I would propose to simply use the designation inflectional 
person marking instead of the confusing term agreement.
2.	 A	concise	history	of	the	term	agreement
The basic insight behind the notion ‘agreement’ is that there are various phe-
nomena in human language that cannot be left unexpressed. Or, in different 
terms, various parts of human language are predictable to a certain extent, up 
the point of being completely redundant. For example, every reader of this 
sentence will immediately know what the last word of this sentence should 
[ . . . ]. The investigation of such restrictions is the main objective of modern 
structuralistic linguistics, but the basic insight of the importance of such 
r estrictions dates back at least to the Modists of the 12th Century. Scholarly 
discussion in that time developed many different analyses of purely g rammatical 
restrictions of possible language structures, separating them from semantics. 
The central new concept introduced by the Modists was regere, of which the 
modern concept government is a direct descendant (Kneepkens 1978). Two 
further important terms in the current context are concordia and congruitas, 
apparently used as synonyms (Law 2003: 166). Although these terms are strik-
ingly similar to the English term concord and the German term Kongruenz, it 
turns out that the link is not a direct one. The terms congruitas/concordia refer 
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to a notion quite similar to the Chomskyan notion of grammaticality (C ovington 
1979: 479– 480) in the sense that a sentence like “colourless ideas sleep furi-
ously” is nonsensical, but grammatical. Congruitas/concordia is attained when 
all structural obligations are met by a sentence. One of these obligations is 
proper subject-verb agreement, which was referred to as similitudo by Thomas 
von Erfurt (Bursill-Hall 1972: 104; Covington 1979: 481).
Yet, the term similitudo vanished with the passing of time. In contrast, the 
term concord reappears in English grammatical descriptions as early as 1513 
in William Lily’s A short introduction of grammar with a meaning similar to 
similitudo. Lily writes the following:
“Concords of Latin speech: for the due joyning of words in construction, it is to be 
u nderstood, that in Latin Speech there be three Concords: The first, between the Nomi-
native case and the Verb: The second between the Substantive and the Adjective: The 
third between the Antecedent and the Relative.” (Lily 1503: D4r)
This notion of concord as covariation between words, which can be attested 
in various parts of the system of a language (e.g. between subject and verb, 
between noun and adjective, or in other constructions) will remain widespread 
as a common concept of linguistics for the centuries to come.
In modern German linguistics, the translation of the term concord is Kon-
gruenz. Although the similarity to the Medieval term congruitas is striking, it 
appears that the term Kongruenz was introduced in the early 19th Century by 
Karl Ferdinand Becker in his Deutsche Sprachlehre of 1829, possibly in paral-
lel to the widespread mathematical usage of the term:
“Ein Thätigkeitsbegriff z.B. blühen, groß wird auf den Begriff eines Seins, z.B. Baum, 
Hund dergestalt bezogen, dass beide Begriffe zu einer Einheit des Gedankens, z.B. “der 
Baum blühet,” “der Hund ist groß,” oder zu einer Einheit des Begriffes z.B. “der blüh-
ende Baum,” “der große Hund ” verbunden werden. Dieses Verhältniß der Einheit – die 
Kongruenz – von Thätigkeit und Sein wird durch die Kongruenz der Form ausgedrückt, 
welche sich in der Flexion des bezogenen Wortes blüh-et, blühend-e, groß-e darstellt.” 
(Becker 1829: 14)
Now, the crucial figure that brings all these developments together was 
Leonard Bloomfield. He appears to have been the first to use the noun agree-
ment as a technical linguistic term in his widely influential book Language: “in 
a rough way, without real boundaries, we can distinguish three general types 
of agreement” (Bloomfield 1933: 191–193). These three types of agreement 
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are called concord/congruence, government, and cross-reference. Interest-
ingly, Bloomfield discusses exactly these terms already in his 1914 book An 
introduction to the study of language, though without using the overarching 
term agreement (Bloomfield 1914: 178–180), so the coinage of the term agree-
ment falls somewhere in between these two publications. There is of course a 
long tradition to use phrases like ‘agree with’ or ‘in agreement with’ in the 
linguistic literature, but these phrases always appear to be used in the general 
meaning of the words without any specific linguistic interpretation. The usage 
of the term agreement as a technical linguistic term started with Bloomfield 
(1933).
There are various notable aspects in this coinage of the term agreement. 
First, Bloomfield appears to treat the terms concord and congruence as syn-
onyms. This most likely is not because he knew about 12th Century linguistics, 
but because he was intimately acquainted with the German linguistic scene in 
which Kongruenz was used roughly synonymous with the English term con-
cord. Second, and more importantly, Bloomfield introduced the new term as a 
cover term to express the intuition that there is a strong similarity between the 
concepts of government and concord (see Corbett 2006: 7–8 for a discussion). 
Both these concepts express some purely structural restrictions on linguistic 
expressions, which is exactly the intuition that lead to the extensive discussion 
in the 12th Century. Bloomfield possibly felt that there was a need for a new 
term to surpass the entrenched terms concord and government, and their re-
spective analyses.
Bloomfield’s attempt to introduce an overarching concept failed. In the 
wake of the large influence of Bloomfield on linguistics, the term agreement 
caught on in the linguistic literature, but it was not used in the sense as pro-
posed by him. Ever since Bloomfield, the term agreement seems basically to 
have been interpreted as a replacement of concord (cf. Corbett 2006: 5–7 for 
some examples of the resulting terminological confusion). Still based in the 
old tradition, Hockett (1958: 214) uses the term concord, but he notes that it is 
“often called agreement”. Representing the new terminology, Chomsky (1965) 
uses the term agreement to refer to erstwhile typical cases of concord, e.g. “the 
grammar must contain agreement rules that assign to the Article all of the fea-
ture specifications for [Gender], [Number], and [Case] of the Noun it modifies” 
(Chomsky 1965: 174 –175). More recently, starting with Steele (1978) and 
Moravcsik (1978), and culminating in the thorough analysis of Corbett (2006), 
the original intuition behind Lily’s term concord has completely been replaced 
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with the new term agreement. I think this development is unfortunate, because 
there is nothing gained by using the term agreement instead of concord. How-
ever, such a development is neigh impossible to revert, so the best we can do is 
not to confuse the situation even more.
However, this is exactly what happened. Most confusingly, there is a parallel 
development in the usage of the term agreement with a rather different out-
come. In the context of Government & Binding (Chomsky 1981), the term 
agreement became restricted to person-number-gender inflection on verbs 
(a bbreviated as AGR). i.e. only the first of the Lily ‘concords’. As a further 
development, all person/number/gender inflection on the verb with reference 
to the subject is today often simply called agreement (cf. Boeckx 2006). In this 
conceptualization, the Bloomfieldian notions concord and cross-reference get 
blurred, resulting in a large confusion in the literature (see Corbett 2003; Cor-
bett 2006: 99–112). This terminological development is likewise extremely 
unfortunate, but too entrenched to be changed easily.
In summary, there are two rather different meanings of the term agreement 
in modern linguistic theory. The first interpretation refers to some kind of 
structural covariance and will be called agreement/concord here. The second 
interpretation seems to treat all subject inflection on verbs as agreement and 
will be called agreement/inflection.
3.	 Directionality	in	sign	language	is	not	agreement/concord
Returning to sign language, Lilo-Martin & Meier argue (I think convincingly) 
that directionality is a kind of person marking, and that directionality has 
c haracteristics of inflectional marking (e.g. lexical idiosyncrasies, LM&M 
§4.2). This immediately allows the conclusion that directionality is a kind of 
agreement/inflection. But, as I have argued before, it might be better to use the 
more transparent name inflectional person marking instead of using the con-
fusing term agreement for this aspect of sign language.
However, Lilo-Martin & Meier also claim that “the properties discussed 
[ . . . ] show that agreement in signed languages is not canonical in Corbett’s 
(2006) sense [i.e. non-canonical agreement/concord, MC]” (LM&M §6.1). 
Corbett indeed presents an explicit discussion of how to establish the canonic-
ity of person agreement (Corbett 2003; Corbett 2006: 99–112), but Lilo-Martin 
& Meier do not follow that proposal at all. They present a few arguments that 
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do not have any relation to the canonicity of agreement (e.g. the classification 
of agreeing and non-agreeing verbs, and the set of backwards verbs), and the 
remaining arguments actually argue against canonical agreement.
Table 1 presents the different kinds of arguments proposed by Corbett to 
determine the canonicity of person agreement. The characteristics of direction-
ality in sign language are shown in boldface, making it immediately obvious 
that directionality is extremely non-canonical person agreement. I will briefly 
discuss these arguments in turn. Morphologically (A), directionality seems to 
be alike to inflectional marking (LM&M §6.1), which is actually the only clear 
argument in favor of an agreement analysis. As for the syntax (B), sentences 
with directional verbs seem to have a freer word order of the full NPs in the 
sentence (LM&M §7.1), which argues for the functional primacy of the direc-
tionality, and thus for non-canonical agreement. As for case (C), directional 
verbs can make reference to more than one argument, which Corbett treats as 
a sign of non-canonicity. The fact that there are some verbs in sign language 
that only refer to the object (LM&M §6.1) has no clear influence on the status 
of agreement. Referentially (D), canonical agreement can refer to anything, 
i ncluding indefinites. However, in sign language pointing and directionality 
seems to be used only for personal reference, so this is a further sign of non-
canonical agreement. The final two arguments are non-committal as to the can-
onicity of person agreement in sign language. First, the distribution of informa-
tion (F) is equal between pointing and directional verbs (i.e. the kind of person 
distinctions attested is the same). Regarding multirepresentation (G), this cri-
terion classifies the fact how common it is for the covarying elements to be 
Table 1. Arguments for directionality in sign language being canonical agreement. The charac-
teristics of sign language are indicated with bold face, arguing that directionality is strongly non-
canonical agreement. It might be better interpreted as cross-reference.
Canonical Agreement Non-canonical Agreement
A: Morphology Inflectional Free
B: Syntax Fixed position of full NPs Free	ordering	of	full	NPs
C: Case Single role inflection Multiple	roles	inflection
D: Referentiality Possibly indefinite Always	referential
E: Content of Reference Anything Only	persons
F: Distribution of Information Less distinctions Equal	number	
of	distinctions
More distinctions 
G: Multirepresentation Obligatorily double 
marking
Null	arguments	
possible
Impossible double 
marking
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both overtly present, i.e. whether null arguments are allowed or not. Lilo- 
Martin & Meier write about this that “languages with rich agreement tend to 
allow null arguments, so the existence of null arguments in ASL is consistent 
with the analysis of directionality as agreement” (§7.2). This argument has it 
completely backwards. First, directionality is clearly not rich agreement in any 
possible interpretation of richness (it has only a first vs. non-first distinction). 
So, the existence of null arguments in ASL does not seem to be determined by 
the richness of the agreement. Further, the existence of null arguments actually 
argues against canonical agreement.
In summary, directionality in sign language does not very much looks like 
agreement/concord at all. The alternative analysis, which seems to be much 
more suitable, is that the person marking of directional verbs in sign language 
is a kind of inflectional person cross-reference. There is actual content that is 
expressed by this marking, it is not just structural redundancy.
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